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The European Parliament received from the Commission of the European 
Communities the Nineteenth Report on competition policy. 
On 17 July 1990, the Committee on Economic and Monetary Affairs and 
Industrial Policy appointed Mr Desmond rapporteur. 
The committee on Legal Affairs and Citizens' Rights and the Committee on 
Agriculture, Fisheries and Rural Development decided to deliver opinions on 
this subject. 
At its meetings of 16 and 17 July 1990, 19, 20, 21 September 1990, 5, 6, 7 
November 1990 and 18, 19, 20 December 1990 the committee considered the 
report. 
At the last meeting, on 19 December 1990, it adopted the report unanimously. 
The following took part in the vote z Beumer, chairman; Desmond, first vice-
chairman; Barton, Beazley, Bofill, Cassidy, Caudron, Colom i Naval; Cravinho, 
de Donnea, De Piccoli; Donnelly, Ferreira Ribeiro, Mr Friedrich, Herman, Hoff, 
Mr Lulling, Mattina, Merz, Metten, Patterson, Pinxten, Porto (for Visentini); 
Read; Roumeliotis, Simpson, Siao Cruellas, Titley (for Wettig), Tongue, van 
der Waal (for Lataillade). 
The opinion of the committee on Legal Affairs and Citizens' Rights is 
attached. The opinion of the Committee on Agriculture, Fisheries and Rural 
Development will be published separately. 
The report was tabled on 20 December 1990. 
The deadline for tabling amendments will appear on the draft agenda for the 
part-aeaaion at which the report is to be considered. 
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A 
embodying the opinion of the European Parliament 
on the Nineteenth report of the commission of the European 
communities on Competition Policy 
The European Parliament 
- having regard to the Nineteenth report of the Commission of the European 
Communities on Competition Policy, 
- having regard to its earlier resolutions on competition policy, 
- having regard to the report of the Committee on Economic and Monetary 
Affairs and Industrial Policy and the opinion of the committee on Legal 
Affairs and Citizens Rights and the Committee on Agriculture, Fisheries and 
Rural Development (A3-0374/90), 
1. Emphasizes that the process of completing the single market, and the 
approach of the 1992 deadline for this task, gives an ever greater 
significance to Community competition policy; affirms that this requires: 
regular and clear reporting on competition policy developments to 
ensure democratic accountability to the European Parliament and a 
clear understanding of these issues by the general public 
vigorous, rapid and efficient administration of competition policy 
a proper balance between competition policy and the other policy 
objectives of the European Community; 
Timing and structure of the Commission's competition policy reports 
2. Considers that the Commission's annual competition policy reports have a 
vital role to play in ensuring democratic accountability of the 
Commission to the European Parliament in a policy area where the 
Commission has very considerable power, and the final say on many 
sensitive issues; believes that the annual reports help to publicise 
competition policy developments at European Community level, and to 
increase awareness of their implications; 
3. Regrets, therefore, that yet again the Commission does not appear to give 
a sufficiently high priority to its annual report, with the result that 
its presentation to Parliament is delayed year after year in spite of 
repeated protests by Parliament; considers it wholly inacceptable that 
its request (in paragraph 40 of its resolution on the Eighteenth Report) 
for the Nineteenth Report to be submitted by 30 April 1990 was 
disregarded; insists that the report be given a higher priority in the 
future, and that sufficient staff and other resources are provided by the 
Commission to DG IV to ensure that it can be presented in subsequent 
years by 30 April at the latest; 
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4. Further notes that the atructura of the report has remained largely 
\ln~tHm~d f~w th@ lfl~t 1~ v@u·e while the complexity of the issues 
involved, the number of areas covered by competit1on policy, ana 
experience in the application of the Treaty regulations have also 
expanded greatly; 
5. Suggests, in order to ensure the full appreciation of major developments 
in competition policy as wall as giving the vital technical details on 
particular sectors, firms, countries and business practices that the 
annual competition policy report should be re-organised as follows : 
the general introduction to include a 1,500 word summary of the whole 
report (which could alao be published separately on a stand-alone 
baa is) 
a detailed index to be provided to the report (as suggested in point 
42 of ita resolution on the Eighteenth Report) so as to enable, for 
example, easier location of the six separate sections in the 
Nineteenth Report where air transport is discussed; 
6. Further believes, in view of the great expansion in the work of the 
Commission on state aids, and its forthcoming new activities in the field 
of merger controls, that the Commission should consider publication of 
its annual report in three separate parts; (i) general competition 
policy, (ii) state aids and (iii) mergera, with a summary and complete 
index for each part; 
7. Emphasises finally the need for wider awareness of the obligations of 
Community competition law among the public in general, and among 
undertakings, and national, regional and local governments in particular; 
welcomes, in this context, the recant publication by the Commission of 
the consolidated Community rules applicable to undertakings, and trusts 
that thia will be regularly updated; underlines, moreover, the 
importance of providing clear and concise summaries of these rules for 
the attention of small and medium-sized enterprises in particular; 
Administration of competition policy 
8. Notes that Community competition policy has had to confront two major new 
challenges in 1990 1 
the unification of Germany 
the implementation of the recently adopted regulation on merger 
controls; 
9. Further notes that, in addition to these new tasks, the Commission will 
have to pursue a number of other key policy objectives, and in 
particular: 
affective follow-up to its second survey of state aids, and the major 
problems that it has revealed 
consistent and effective application of Community competition policy 
in sectors such as automobiles, financial services, air transport and 
telecommunications 
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extension of Community competition policy in fields where the 
Commission has bean inadequately involved, or not at all, such as the 
liberal profassiona. 
10. Emphasises that these new or reinforced tasks involve a great increase in 
an already heavy workload for the competition policy services of the 
Commission (DG IV); notes with concern, in this context, that there were 
already 3,239 cases pending at the end of 1989, and that only a small 
proportion of these cases were submitted during 1989, with many cases 
pending for several years; 
11. Considers, therefore, that there must be an urgent and immediate increase 
in the staff available for implementing community competition law; 
12. Further considers that any reinforcement of DG IV staff should take into 
sufficient account the need for a wide mix of skills, in view especially 
of the increased complexity of the economic analysis that is required; 
suggests, in this context, that the European community should look at the 
countries with the longest history of antitrust legislation such as 
Canada and the United States for their experience in handling staff 
requirements when faced with expansions in case load, case law and 
additional fields of activity, noting their widespread use of applied 
economists, those with joint economics and law degrees and those with 
business experience, especially in marketing; 
13. Considers that the Commission's programme of research as outlined in part 
IV of the report should be conceived as a valuable instrument in the 
implementation of Community competition policy, and that it needs, 
therefore, to be better integrated into the day-to-day work programme of 
DG IV; requests information on the criteria used by the commission in 
defining ita research priorities; 
welcomes the valuable data that is provided in Chapter 1 of part IV of 
the report on mergers, acquisitions and recent structural changes in EC 
industry, but regrets the lack of detail in chapter 2 on the programme of 
studies and their results; asks the Commission to state briefly the 
countries and sectors covered by each research project, as was the custom 
in earlier reports, as well as giving full details in the Annex; 
14. Considers that the right balance must be struck in the administration of 
Community competition policy between the need for speed, efficiency and 
fairness, and recalls ita previously expressed concern (as in paragraph 
44 of its resolution on the Eighteenth Report) that there should be an 
effective separation of the Commission's functions as investigator, 
prosecutor and judge in its administrative procedures; calls for an 
updated assessment of the role of the Hearing Officer in this context; 
welcomes the fact that legal safeguards on competition policy matters 
have been strengthened as a result of the creation of the Court of First 
Instance; 
15. Calla for a report on the advisability of establishing a separate 
European Cartel Office responsible to the European Parliament; considers 
that this could have some advantages in terms of guaranteeing greater 
administrative independence, but points out that it could also lead to 
greater bureaucracy and duplication of functions between the proposed 
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cartel office and the COIM'Iisaion, believes that the effective staffing 
of DG IV ia the priority at the praeant time, 
16. Welcomes the recent decisions by the Court of Justice in the Hoechst, Dow 
Chemical and Dow Benelux cases whic~ strengthen the Commission's 
investigation powers, including surprise investigations, in order to 
provide better factual evidence about particular enterprises; further 
requests the commission, however, to give better particulars in its 
decisions ordering investigations of undertakings and thereby to respond 
to the critical remarks made by the Court of Justice in its judgment in 
joined cases 46/87 and 227/88 HOECHST v. COMMISSION; 
17. considers, in the interest of furthering democratic 
the European Parliament should be informed of 




present; calls, in 
for all draft block exemptions or other implementing Commission 
decisions to be sent to the Parliament at the same time as they are 
sent to the Advisory Committee on Restrictive Practices and Dominant 
Positions, the Advisory Committee on Mergers and to other interested 
parties; 
German unification 
18. Considers that German unification, and the process of incorporating the 
former GDR within the European Community and within a social market 
rather than a centrally planned economy, has major consequences for 
Community competition policy : 
in terms of evaluating the state aids that are provided to reshape the 
former GDR's infrastructure and economy 
in terms of evaluating the impact on competition of the privatisation 
process being carried out by the State Holding Company (the 
Treuhandanstalt); 
19. Recognizes the need for state aids from the German Government to help in 
the former GDR, but insists that they be fully transparent, and that they 
do not create new distortions of competition at the expense, in 
particular, of other disadvantaged and peripheral regions of the 
community; 
20. Notes that the unprecedentedly rapid and far-reaching process of selling 
off the assets of the former "Kombinate" by the Treuhandanstalt should 
greatly increase economic efficiency but also poses considerable risks as 
far as fair and equal competition are concerned; 
21. Warns against the possible creation of new monopolies and dominant 
positions as a result of take-overs of former GDR enterprises by German 
firms. Insists that there be fully transparent public sales procedures 
by the Treuhandanstalt, and that there should be no discrimination of any 
kind between German and other Community firms in this process; 
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The merger control regulation 
22. Welcomes the fact that the Council finally took the decision to adopt a 
merger control regulation in December 1989 after so many years of 
stalemate; 
23. Congratulates the Commission, and in particular its mergers task force, 
on its rapid adoption of the implementing regulation and its creation of 
the necessary infrastructure so that the merger control regulation was 
able to come into force on 21 September 1990; 
24. Regrets, however, that the first draft of the implementing regulation was 
prepared in April 1990 and circulated to interested parties, but that 
Parliament was only informed in June, giving it inadequate time to 
comment before the regulation's adoption in July; 
25. Considers the aggregate world turnover threshold of ECU 5 billion to be 
unrealistically high; this high threshold, allied to the express 
provision that Articles 85 and 86, shall not apply to concentrations 
irrespective of the turnover of the undertakings involved, prevents the 
Commission from scrutinizing, on the basis of Regulation No 17, many 
concentrations which restrict competition within the EEC and have an 
effect on inter-state trade, the Commission thus being obliged to operate 
on the inadequate basis of Article 89; therefore supports any proposal to 
reduce the thresholds provided for in Article 1 of the merger Regulation; 
26. Considers that the unsatisfactory relationship between the competence& of 
the Commission and the Member States on merger controls must also be 
improved; 
considers, in this context, that there are too many exceptions to the 
basic rules in Council Regulation 4064/89 and that too much legal 
uncertainty is created as a result; believes that unnecessary overlap 
and uncertainty are created, for example, by those provisions of the 
regulation which allow national scrutiny of certain mergers on the basis 
of criteria such as considerations of public security, plurality of the 
media, prudential control of financial institutions and even vaguer 
"other public interest" considerations pursuant to Article 21 of the 
Regulation; 
calls on the Commission, moreover, to have recourse only in the most 
exceptional circumstances to Article 9 of the merger regulation, whereby 
it may refer a notified concentration to the competent authorities of a 
Member State in the event of a threat to competition in a distinct market 
in that Member State and to consider the repeal of this provision when 
it comes up for review before 21 December 1993; 
recognizes that the regulation has now just come into operation, but 
believes that the problems outlined above should be immediately examined, 
with a view to eliminating them as soon as possible, taking account of 
the need first to gain adequate experience of the regulation and to 
ensure DG IV has sufficient resources to cope with any extension of 
competence; 
27. Calls upon the Commission further to reduce the amount of information 
required in Form co from the companies concerned, when notifying the 
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28. 
Commission of a proposed concentration, thereby saving them unnecessary 
time and financial costa; I 
Calls on the Commission to report back on 
functioning of the merger control regulation 
practical experience has been gained; 
other aspects of the 
as soon as sufficient 
29. Welcomes the commission's Notice regarding the concentrative and 
cooperative operation under the merger regulation (1990 OJ c 203/10) as 
being a very necessary clarification of its thinking as to when minority 
share acquisitions, partial mergers or concentrative joint-ventures may 
fall within the scope of the regulation; 
30. Requests the Commission to submit its promised complementary guidelines 
on joint ventures; 
Need for a proper balance between competition policy and the other policy 
objectives of the European Community. 
31. Affirms that competition is a complex interaction of economic forces and 
not a simple solution to all economic problems, and that therefore the 
major objective of competition policy must be to create and maintain 
workable and effective competition in all sectors, rather than to strive 
for the unrealistic theoretical model of perfect competition; 
32. Welcomes, for example, the commission's widespread use of block 
exemptions (as in its latest proposals on insurance), in order to give 
firms the appropriate balance between legal security and freedom to 
compete; calls, however, for continued careful monitoring of how the 
adopted block exemptions are working in practice to see if they are 
really achieving their objectives; 
33. Insists, moreover, that competition policy should not be carried out in 
isolation from other vital policy objectives of the Community, such as 
increasing Community industrial competitiveness, and strengthening 
economic and social cohesion and the achievement of sustainable 
development; considers that these objectives must be closely coordinated, 
and believes that one of the key ways of judging the effectiveness of 
Community competition policy is by reference to whether those wider 
objectives are being met; 
34. Considers that this would be facilitated by systematic review of the 
impact of Commission decisions in the field of competition; calls, 
therefore, upon the Commission to include in each such decision 'an 
economic, social and environmental audit', looking at the impact on 
economic competitiveness, on levels of employment, on social security 
costs and on regional development; 
35. Considers, finally, that in some cases Community competition policy has 
had too great a burden placed upon it, as in certain industrial sectors 
where the Community's competition rules have had to be interpreted by DG 
IV in the absence of a Community industrial strategy for the sector 
concerned, which would include aid criteria within a wider policy 
context; 
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36. considers, therefore, that for this reason, and in the interests of 
maximum transparency in the Community's competition policy, the 
Commission should give further consideration to defining more clearly how 
industrial, regional and other policy considerations should be taken into 
account in decisions on competition policy, including state aids, and 
should report thereon; 
37. Believes that the above principles are of particular importance in 
assessing the Commission's policy on state aids; 
State aids 
38. Welcomes the publication of the commission's second survey on state aids 
as an invaluable instrument for analyzing the different types and volume 
of state aid within the Community and the distortions that they can 
cause; regrets that certain countries (notably Belgium and Greece) have 
not fully cooperated with the Commission in preparing the survey; 
requests clarification from the Commission as to how and when its 
proposed standardised system of annual reporting on state aids will be 
fully introduced, and what sanctions there will be for non-compliance; 
39. Reaffirms that state aids should not be judged as a good or bad 
phenomenon in their own right, nor in terms of their absolute levels, but 
according to the criteria for which they are used; 
40. · Believes, however, that differentials in 
objective from one Community country 
distortions of competition, and could 
impeding the creation of a true internal 
41. calls, therefore, for 
levels of state aid for the same 
to another may cause severe 
be one of the key factors in 
market by 1992; 
the fullest possible transparency of aids granted by national and 
regional authorities 
a clearer and more effective Community framework for national and 
regional aids, which would require any such aids to be justified in 
terms of consistent and strictly defined social, environmental, 
regional or industrial policy considerations 
a sustained effort at Community level to reduce aid differentials 
from one country to another where this is needed in order to ensure 
fairer conditions of competition; 
42. Believes, however, that certain aid differentials should be permitted in 
favour of disadvantaged areas within the Community, in order to take due 
account of differences in levels of employment and economic development 
between different regions and countries; 
43. Calls upon the Commission to vigorously apply Articles 92 and 93 to both 
public and privately owned companies; regrets the tendency of certain 
Member States to unduly favour certain of their own private or public 
companies by means of illegal and disguised aids; 
44. Calls the attention of the Member States to the need to comply with the 
provisions of Article 93 ( 3) concerning the obligation to inform the 
DOC EN\RR\101709 
- 10 - PE 144.495/fin. 
Commission in sufficient time of all plans to grant or alter aid; urges 
the Commission to use all means at its disposal to enforce the' law in 
this respect; further urges the Commission to continue to recover any 
auma illegally paid by Member States by way of State aid, and to have 
such aid paid into the Community budget; 
45. Insists that all Community countries fully respect the Commission's 
framework of state aida for the motor vehicle sector, and that the 
Commission takes tough action to combat abuses throughout the Community; 
calls, moreover, for a Commission investigation as to whether 
unreasonable differences in prices and delivery times for similar 
vehicles have again opened up within the Community; 
46. Requests clarification as to why the recent Commission guidelines for the 
examination of state aida to Community shipping companies were forwarded 
to the Council but not apparently to the European Parliament; 
4 7. Welcomes the Commission's acceptance of certain state aids to help the 
long-term unemployed, which could be of particular value as Europe faces 
the prospect of an economic downturn in the light of the Gulf crisis, the 
fall in agricultural prices and other factors; 
Other specific issues 
48. Welcomes the Commission's increased emphasis on opening up competition in 
the audiovisual media, but calls on the Commission to take whatever 
additional legal measures are necessary to safeguard pluralism and 
freedom of expression and to reduce the concentration of ownership in the 
hands of transnational multi-media groups, such as those led by Murdoch, 
Maxwell and Berlusconi; 
49. Calls on the Commission to specify what new measures it will take 
to apply competition rules in the energy sector more strictly than in 
the past 
to further open up competition in the banking and insurance sectors, 
and with particular reference to bank charges for intra-Community 
payments 
to open up competition in the often closed "liberal" professions; 
50. Demands that the Commission, in the run-up to further liberalization of 
competition in the air transport sector after 1 January 1993, remains 
extremely vigilant in ensuring that currently proposed cooperation 
agreements and practices between the flag-carrying airlines (for example 
the proposed joint venture or merger between British Airways, SABENA and 
KLM, the "cooperation agreement" between Air France and Lufthansa or the 
proposed absorption of UTA by Air France) do not serve as a means for 
these airlines further to secure their already dominant market positions 
before greater liberalization measures are introduced; 
51. Notes with concern the increased concentration in the food sector caused 
by many acquisitions and mergers; commends the Commission's decision to 
keep a close watch on restructuring in this sector, and asks for this 
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vigilance to include the dhtribution of food products by the grocery 
trade, and concentration in retailing more generally! 
52. Welcomes the Belasco judgement of the Court of Justice which made it 
clear that a Belgian cartel concerned with the marketing of products 
purely within Belgium could have a significant influence on intra-
Community trade through its restrictions on foreign competition in 
Belgium, and believes this has important implications for community 
competition law; 
53. Considers that increased cooperation on, and if possible, common rules on 
competition policy should be an important objective of the current 
negotiations for a European economic space with the EFTA countries; 
believes that this should also apply to the countries of Central and 
Eastern Europe which are developing a social market economy, although 
their special problema in the short and medium term should also be 
recognized; 
54. Supports the concept of closer cooperation between the Community and us 
competition authorities on the issue of extra-territorial application of 
Community law; 
55. Calls on the Commission to provide, within eight weeks of receipt of this 
report, a point-by-point initial written response indicating the 
commission's views and intended actions and, where the initial response 
indicates a need for further consideration and/or further action, the 
timescale for such consideration and/or action; 
56. Instructs its President to forward this resolution to the Commission, 
the Council, the competition authorities in the Member States and the 
governments and parliaments of the Member States. 
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B. 
EXPLANATORY STATEMENT 
1. The Commission's 19th Report is a detailed and lengthy document (339 
pages, with an additional 79 pages of annexes), which covera the whole 
range of the Commission' a activities on competition policy in 1989-90. 
Since ita publication (in provisional form only, the final printed 
version was still not available in mid October 1990 1) there have been 
further major developments in the field of competition policy, and, in 
particular, the new challenges to competition policy posed by the process 
of Garman unification, implementation of the new Community merger control 
regulation, and publication of the Commission's second survey on State 
aida. 
2. To do full justice to this report and to these subsequent developments 1 
would require in-depth examination by a specific competition Committee, 
or at the very least sub-committee of the Parliament. Instead this task 
has to be carried out within the context of one annual report from within 
the already overstretched Economic Committee. It is inevitable, 
therefore, that the accompanying resolution is a lengthy one. 
Nevertheless your rapporteur has sought to group the main issues under a 
number of key headings : 
(i) The timing and structure of the Commission's competition policy 
reports : 
Production of the Commission's reports should be speeded up, 
their structure should be changed, and they should receive wider 
publicity. 
(ii) Administration of competition policy : 
(iii) 
The Commission's DG IV should be given further staff (including 
staff with economic and business backgrounds) to carry out its 
increasingly complex range of tasks. The commission's economic 
research on competition issues should be better integrated into 
DG IV's day-to-day work programme. The Commission's procedures 
should be improved, but a separate European cartel office would 
be premature at the present time. The Parliament should be kept 
informed of proposed commission competition policy initiatives 
earlier than at present. 
German unification 
The impact of this process on conditions of competition will have 
to be carefully monitored, especially in terms of evaluating 
State aids, and the privatisation process being carried out by 
the Treuhandanstalt (the State Holding company). 
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(iv) The merger control regulations : 
Ita implementation is to be welcomed, but the regulation needs to 
be improved (with lower thresholds, and greater legal certainty 
as to whether mergers will be considered at community or national 
level). 
(v) The need for a proper balance between competition policy and the 
other policy obiectives of the Community : 
Competition policy is of vital importance for the Community, 
especially in the 1992 context, but it should not have too great 
a burden placed upon it, and it should not be carried out in 
isolation from other vital policy objectives of the Community, 
such as increasing Community industrial competitiveness, and 
strengthening economic and social cohesion. An economic and 
social audit of Commission decisions on competition policy 
matters would be invaluable in this context. 
(vi) State aids : 
The Commission's second survey of State aids is to be strongly 
welcomed, but vigorous follow-up is required. State aids should 
be judged according to the criteria for which they are used, but 
differentials in levels of State aid for the same objective from 
one Community country to another may cause severe distortions of 
competition. Certain differentials are justified, however, in 
favour of the moat disadvantaged areas within the Community. 
3. In addition to these six major sets of issues, your rapporteur has listed 
a number of other specific issues at the end. He has sought, however, to 
restrict these to a minimum. 
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OPINION 
(Rule 120 of the Rules of Procedure) 
of the Committee on Legal Affairs and Citizens' Rights 
for the Committee on Economic and Monetary Affairs 
and Industrial Policy 
Drafteman1 Mr Anthony SIMPSON 
At ita meeting of 19 September 1990, the Committee on Legal Affairs and 
Citizens' Righte appointed Mr SIMPSON draftsman. 
At its meetings of 30/31 october 1990 and 28/29 November 1990, it considered 
the draft opinion and at the latter meeting adopted its conclusions as a whole 
unopposed with one abstention. 
The following took part in the vote: VAYSSADE, acting chairman, SPERONI, vice-
chairman, SIMPSON draftsman1 FALCONER, GARCIA AMIGO, GRUND, MciNTOSH, MEDINA 
ORTEGA, MERZ, SALEMA, TAZDAIT and VALENT. 
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I. Intr9duction 
1. In respect of the Commhsion' s Report on competition Policy for 1989, 
the observations below of the Committee on Legal Affairs and Cit hens • 






the Council Regulation on the control of concentrations between 
undertakinge1 (the merger Regulation), the major event in the 
field of competition law in 1989; 
air transport; 
state aids. 
II. Procedural safeguards 
2. The 19th Report gives an outline of 3 important judgments of the Court of 
Justice on the Commission's powers regarding requests for information from 
undertakings under investigation for alleged anti-competitive practices (p. 
126-134, joined cases 46/87 and 227/88 HOECHST v. COMMISSION judgment of 21 
September 1989, case 374/87 ORKEM v. COMMISSION and case 27/88 SOLVAY v. 
COMMISSION judgments of 18 OCtober 1989). 
3. The European Parliament has constantly underlined its concern at the 
Commission acting as both investigator, prosecutor and judge during 
administrative procedures under Articles 85 and 86. This concern must 
also have been shared by the court of Justice in the Orkem and Solvay 
cases, in finding that undertakings enjoy a privilege against self-
incrimination and are permitted not to answer investigators' leading 
questions, which would amount to an admission of an infringement of EEC 
competition rules. The Court held that the preliminary fact-finding 
investigations of the Commission must not be conducted in such a way that 
the chances of a fair hearing during the procedure following the delivery 
of the Statement of objections are compromised and that the burden of proof 
incumbent on the Commission to prove its case should not be reversed. 
Therefore the Committee on Legal Affairs and Citizens' Rights repeats its 
request that "the Commission's DG IV be structured in such a way that there 
is a separation of its functions as investigator, prosecutor and judge 
within its internal administrative procedures" (cf. Opinion of Committee on 
Legal Affairs and Citizens' Rights on 18th Report on Competition Policy-
PE 134.288/fin.). 
4. The Committee on Legal Affairs and Citizens' Rights would also recommend 
that, although the Court in the HOECHST case accepted the legality of the 
investigation decision taken by the Commission under Article 14(3) of 
Regulation 17, nonetheless the Commission heed the Court's comment that the 
decision would have benefitted from being more precise and in this respect 
is to be criticized. 
1 Council Regulation N° 4064/89, 1989 OJ L 395/1 
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III. Cont;·ol ~..•t concejltrat!Q!l! 
5. On :.11 Dl'lcember 1989, 16 years after the first Cor..rt:ission proposal on 
merger control, the Council adopted a Regulation on the control of 
concentcations between undertakings - the merger Regulation. 
There is no doubt that the Council was moved to adopt this Regulation not 
only because of the looming date of 1 January 1993, but also because o~ the 
Commission's willingness to examine mergers under Articles 85 (1) and 86 
EEC Treaty in the absence of a Regulation1 • 
6. The Regulation is to apply to concentrations of a commun.t.tv dimension, 
which is deemed to pertain where: 
the total world turnover of the 
ECU 5 000 million, and 
undertakings concerned is over 
the aggregate Community turnover of at least 2 of the undertakings 
concernl:ld is over ECU 250 million, unless each of the undertakings 
concerned achieves more than two-thirds of its aggregate Community 
turnover within a single Member State. 
7. Furthflrmore, the Regulation alone is to apply to concentrations, 
irrespective of their turnover, since Regulation N° 17, adopted under 
Article 87 EEC Treaty to give effect to the principles enshrined in 
Articles 85 and 86, shall not be applicable to concentrations (Article 22 
of the Regulation). 
1 In case 6/72 Europemballage v Commission "Continental Can" 1973 ECR 
215, the Court of Justice held that Article 86 could apply to a merger when 
"an undertaking in a dominant position strengthens that position in such a way 
that the degree of dominance substantially fetters competition." 
In jolned cases 142 and 156/84 BAT & REYNOLDS v. COMMISSION, judgment of 17 
November 1987, the Court of Justice held that Article 85(1) could apply to an 
agreement whereby an undertaking acquired a minority interest in another 
undertakinq (both undertakings continuing to remain independent) if the 
acquisition of that interest influences the market behaviour of the 
undertakings in such a way that competition is or may be restricted. 
'I'he Com!'llssion has applied Article 85 ( 1) and Article 86 to a number of 
mergers or takeover bids reported in the newspapers: 
British Airways' takeover of British Caledonian and the joint takeover 
bid of Allied Lyons, Guinness and Grand Metropolitan for the Irish 
Distillers Group (cf. 18th Report on Competition Policy p. 99':"'101) 
(Article 85(1)), 
the proposed joint take-over of Plessay by GEC and Siemens (Article 
85 {1)), 
the takeover bid of Minorco for Consolidated Gold Fields (Article 86) 
anrt the link-up between Rhone-Poulenc and Monsanto as regards 2 
product Hnes (Article 86) (cf. 19th Report on Competition Policy, pp. 
J.l0·-114). 
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8. Thus one is entitled to ask whether the fixing of such a high turnover 
threshold constitutes a step backwards, since it will prevent the 
Commission from examining directly under Articles 85 and 86 mergers and 
concentrations, which it would otherwise have been able to scrutinize 
before the coming into force of the Regulation. 
The commission only anticipates 50 notifications in the first twelve 
months 1 it has been estimated that of the 200 major UK mergers in 1989, 
only 8 would have had to be notified under the Regulation. 
9. While the promotion of the "one-atop" concept, whereby concentrations of a 
Community dimension will be subject to the Regulation, all other 
concentrations being subject to national law, is to be approved as being 
in the interest of legal certainty, nonetheless the Committee on Legal 
Affairs and Citizens' Rights would approves 
any Commission proposal for a downward revision of these thresholds to 
be adopted by council before 21 December 1993; 
any Commission initiative provided for 
ensure that concentrations, not meeting 
the Regulation, nonetheless respect 
Articles 85 and 86. 
under Article 89 EEC Treaty to 
the high turnover thresholds of 
the principles enunciated in 
10. There are three exception& to the "one-stop" concept, which are commented 
on briefly below: 
(i) under Article 9(2) of the Regulation, Member States may "inform" the 
commission that a concentration of a Community dimension may create or 
strengthen a dominant position on a "distinct" market within th~t 
Member state; under Article 9(3), the Commission may itself deal with 
the case in order to maintain effective competition in the market 
concerned or refer the case to the competent national authorities; the 
committee on Legal Affairs and Citizens' Rights would give every 
encouragement to the Commission to deal with the case without a 
referral to the national authorities, while attaching, to any decision 
on the compatibility of the concentration in question with the common 
market, conditions which take into account the special circumstances of 
the distinct market; when reviewing this Article before 21 December 
1993, the Commission should consider its repeal; 
(ii) under Article 21(3) of the Regulation, Member States may take 
"appropriate measures" (presumably blocking a merger that has been 
cleared by the Commission) to protect "legitimate interests" which 
shall include "public security, plurality of the media and prudential 
rules"; 
(iii) under Article 22(3) the Commission may be invited by a Member State to 
scrutinize a concentration which, while not of a Community dimension, 
nevertheless restricts competition within a Member State and effects 
inter-State trade. 
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11. By and large the Regulation is to be welcomed; especially welcome is the 
Commission Notice regarding the concentrative and cooperative operations 
under the merger Regulation, 1 which sheds much light on the extent to which 
partial mergers and concentrative joint-ventures as opposed to cooperative 
joint ventures fall within the scope of the Regulation. 
12. The Regulation in Article 4 ( 1) requires notification to the Commission 
within one week of a bid or deal. This must be made on Form co. 2 While 
appreciating that the Commission has already taken steps to reduce the 
amount of information required, further such steps should be taken. The 
time and expanse for the companies concerned of furnishing all the 
information required is disproportionate to the value of such information. 
IV. Air transport 
13. The Community has adopted a not unimpressive panoply of measures to 
liberalize competition in the air transport market. 
The block exemption regulations in force until 31 December 1992, which 
provides a useful transitional regime in readiness for more intense 
competition after that date, may be briefly summarized as follows: 
joint planning and coordination of capacity is permitted to allow for 
scheduling of flights at the busy times of the day, subject to 
conditions to prevent illegal market sharing; 
revenues may be pooled, but only to compensate effectively for 
carriers providing services at less busy times; 
price consultations have been permitted in response to increased price 
competition introduced by Council Directive 87/601, replaced by 
Council Regulation N° 2342/90 (cf. footnote 2 below); participation 
must be voluntary, the results non-binding and the commission services 
must be kept fully informed; 
consultations between air carriers on slot allocations are permitted 
provided that access to such consultations are open to all carriers 
and that any rules of priority established "are neither directly nor 
indirectly related to carrier identity or nationality or category of 
service" 1 
joint ventures for the 
reservation systems are 
carriers have fair access 
availability are displayed 
reasonable. 
development and operation of computer 
permitted, provided that participating 
to the system, that schedules, fares and 
in a neutral way and that fees charged are 
14. Further liberalization measures after 1 January 1993 should include: 
1 1990 OJ n. c 202/10 
2 Cf. Annex I to Commission Regulation (EEC) N° 2367/90 on the 
notifications, time limits and hearings provided for in Council 
Regulation (EEC) N° 4064/89 on the control of concentrations between 
undertakings 
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the abolition of capacity sharing restrictions between Member States 
(from 1 November 1990, a Member State shall be obliged to permit 
another Member State to increase its capacity share for an season up 
to 67.5\); 
the objective of a double-disapproval system for fares, whether a fare 
schedule submitted by a carrier for scheduled flights between two 
Member States may only be rejected if both Member states concerned 
disapprove the proposed schedule; 
the extension of the competition rules to flights between the 
Community and third countries; 
a review of the existing block exemptions. 
15. In its 19th Report on Competition Policy, the Commission has mentioned 12 
joint venture agreements between air carriers relating to services on 
certain routes (e.g. the joint venture agreement between AIR FRANCE and 
ALITALIA relating to the Paris/Milan and Paris/Turin routes). 
However of greater concern are agreements, presently before the Commission 
(for example the British Airways, Sabena, KLM joint venture or merger, the 
"cooperation agreement" between AIR FRANCE and LUFTHANSA or the absorption 
of UTA by AIR FRANCE), which are of far greater import than the twelve 
agreements above-mentioned. 
The Committee on Legal Affairs and Citizens' Rights demands that the 
Commission remains exceptionally vigilant and scrutinizes these commercial 
transactions between flag-carriers so as to ensure that no anti-competitive 
practices will result therefrom which would serve to secure their dominant 
market position before fuller liberalization measures come into effect. 
Otherwise such fuller liberalization measures could be rendered nugatory. 
In this regard it is especially important that hub domination, whereby an 
airline dominates scheduling at an airport which benefits from considerable 
feeder traffic for onward flights, is not allowed to develop. 
v. State aids 
16. The Committee on Legal Affairs and Citizens' Rights welcomes the 
Commission's decision to review existing state aid schemes more 
systematically under Article 93(1) and assures the Commission that it can 
rely on the support of the Parliament in this exercise. The Committee on 
Legal Affairs and Citizens' Rights feels that the Member States must be 
more scrupulous in cooperating with the Commission and in notifying their 
State aids to it, where required by Community law, and urges the Commission 
to take the necessary steps to ensure such cooperation (the judgement of 14 
February 1990 of the Court of Justice in case 301/87 France v. Commission 
is instructive in this regard). 
17. The Committee on Legal Affairs and Citizens' Rights draws particular 
attention to the problem of State aids for state-owned companies, often in 
a disguised form. State-owned companies should not be treated in any 
different way to privately owned companies. The Commission must be 
particularly vigilant on this subject. 
In this context, attention is drawn to a number of examples: 
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(i) Flnmeccanic!!., an I"t:alian state holding company, which owned Alfa-
Romeo, received heavy government finance to restore Alfa to health, 
before selling the car company to Fiat. The Commission has ordered 
repayment by Finmeccanica of ECU 405 million in illegal aid paid in 
1985 and 1986; the case is currently before the Court of Justice (case 
305/89); 
(ii) the operating losses of ENI-Lanerossi, a state-owned textile company, 
were covered by public funds to the extent of 100\ of its turnovet. 
Having received a complaint from European textile competitors, the 
Commission took a decision, ordering the Italian government to recover 
ECU 170 million, illegally paid over in aid; this decision has been 
appealed against before the Court of Justice (case 303/88); 
(iii) the French government has failed to fulfil its undertaking to 
supervise a restructuring programme of Renault, which was a condition 
of the Commiasion's acceptance of a FF 12 million write-off (cf. 19th 
Report on competition policy, p.236) and the illegally assisted take-
over of the Rover Division of British Leyland by British Aerospace. 
VI. Q_onclusions 
In the light of the foregoing the Committee on Legal Affairs and Citizens' 
Rights requests the committee on Economic and Monetary Affairs and Industrial 
Policy to include in its motion for a resolution on the 19th Report on 
Competition Policy the following paragraphs: 
1. - "requests the Commission to take all necessary steps to continue to 
lower the unacceptably high number of files still outstanding (3239 
cases pending at year end 1989 as against 3451 at year end 1988);" 
2. - "demands an explanation from the Commission as to why it has not yet 
met the request, made in Parliament's Resolution of 18 January 1990 on 
the 18th report on competition policy, that the Commission introduce 
within its internal operational procedures a separation of its 
function~ as investigator, prosecutor and judge of alleged anti-trust 
practices, the confusion of these roles being instrumental in the 
partial annulment of the Commission decisions requesting information 
(cnse 374/87 ORKEM v. COMMISSION and case 27/88 SOLVAY v. CQMMISSION); 
further requests the Commission to give better particulars in ~ts 
decisions ordering investigations of undertakings and thereby to 
respond to the critical remarks made by the Court of Justice in ,\ts 
judgment in joined cases 46/87 and 227/88 HOECHST v. COMMISSION; " 
3. - "'>~slcomes Council Regulation (CEE) N° 4064/89 (the merger Regulatic;m) 
on the control of concentrations between undertakings, but considers 
the aggregate world turnover threshold of ECU 5 billion to ,be 
unrealistically high; this high threshold, allied to the express 
provision that Articles 85 and 86, shall not apply to concentrations 
irrespective of the turnover of the undertakings involved, prevents 
the Commission from scrutinizing, on the basis of Regulation N° 17, 
many concentrations, which restrict competition within the EEC and 
have an effect on inter-state trade, the Commission thus being obli9ed 
to operate on the inadequate basis of Article 89; therefore supports 
any proposal to reduce the thresholds provided for in Article l of the 
merger. Regulation;" 
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"calla on the Commission to have recourse, only in the most 
exceptional circumstances, to Article 9 of the merger Regulation, 
whereby it may refer a notified concentration to the competent 
authorities of a Member States in the event of a t.I· .ceat to competition 
in a distinct market in that Member State and to propose the repeal of 
this provision when it comes up for review before 21 December 1993;" 
"calls upon the Commission further to reduce the amount of information 
required in Form CO from the companies concerned, when notifying the 
Commission of a proposed concentration, thereby saving them unnecessary 
time and financial coats; 
"welcomes the commission's Notice regarding the concentrative and 
cooperative operation under the merger Regulation (1990 OJ c 203/10) 
as being a very necessary clarification of its thinking as to when 
minority share acquisitions, partial mergers or concentrative joint-
ventures may fall within the scope of the Regulation;" 
"demands that the Commission, in the run-up to further liberalization 
of competition in the air transport sector after 1 January 1993, 
remains extremely vigilant in ensuring that currently proposed 
cooperation agreements and practices between the flag-carrying 
airlines (for example the proposed joint venture or merger between 
British Airways, SABENA and KLM, the "cooperation agreement" between 
Air France and Lufthansa or the proposed absorption of UTA by Air 
France) do not serve as a means for these airlines further to secure 
their already dominant market positions before greater liberalization 
measures are introduced;" 
"calls the attention of the Member States to the need to comply with 
the provisions of Article 93(3) concerning the obligation to inform 
the Commission in sufficient time of all plans to grant or alter aid; 
urges the Commission to use all means at its disposal to enforce the 
law in this respect; further urges the Commission to continue to 
recover any sums illegally paid by Member States by way of State aid;" 
"calls upon the Commission to apply Articles 92 and 93 as vigorously 
to public companies as to privately owned companies; regrets the 
tendency of certain Member States unduly to favour public companie~ by 
means of illegal and disguised aida." 
DOC_EN\RR\101709 
- 22 - PE 144.495/fin. 
